Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2015

Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the Constitutive Role of
Law
Simon Deakin
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law

David Gindis
University of Hertfordshire Business School

Geoffrey M. Hodgson
University of Hertfordshire

Kainan Huang
Shandong University

Katharina Pistor
Columbia Law School, kpisto@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law and Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Simon Deakin, David Gindis, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Kainan Huang & Katharina Pistor, Legal
Institutionalism: Capitalism and the Constitutive Role of Law, JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS, VOL. 45,
P. 188, 2015; UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE CENTRE FOR BUSINESS RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 468 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2280

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

PAPER NO. 26/2015
APRIL 2015

Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the
Constitutive Role of Law
Simon Deakin, David Gindis, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Kainan Huang
& Katharina Pistor

Further information about the University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies
Research Paper Series can be found at http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn/

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601035

LEGAL INSTITUTIONALISM: CAPITALISM AND THE
CONSTITUTIVE ROLE OF LAW
Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge
Working Paper No. 468

Simon Deakin
CBR, University of Cambridge
s.deakin@cbr.cam.ac.uk
David Gindis
Hertfordshire Business School, University of Hertfordshire
d.gindis@herts.ac.uk

Geoffrey M. Hodgson
Hertfordshire Business School, University of Hertfordshire
g.m.hodgson@herts.ac.uk
Kainan Huang
Shandong University
kennen@125.com
Katharina Pistor
Columbia Law School
kpisto@law.columbia.edu

March 2015

This working paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Corporate
Governance

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601035

Abstract
Social scientists have paid insufficient attention to the role of law in constituting
the economic institutions of capitalism. Part of this neglect emanates from
inadequate conceptions of the nature of law itself. Spontaneous conceptions of
law and property rights that downplay the role of the state are criticized here,
because they typically assume relatively small numbers of agents and underplay
the complexity and uncertainty in developed capitalist systems. In developed
capitalist economies, law is sustained through interaction between private
agents, courts and the legislative apparatus. Law is also a key institution for
overcoming contracting uncertainties. It is furthermore a part of the power
structure of society, and a major means by which power is exercised. This
argument is illustrated by considering institutions such as property and the firm.
Complex systems of law have played a crucial role in capitalist development
and are also vital for developing economies.
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1. Introduction
At this early stage of its development, legal institutionalism1 involves claims
concerning the nature of social reality, at least in modern, developed socioeconomic systems. It does not yet provide a full theoretical approach, but it does
provide some tentative and limited indications concerning theory and policy.
There are two primary ontological claims. The first concerns the nature of law.
It is argued that law (at least in the fullest and most developed sense) necessarily
involves both the state (broadly construed to refer to a realm of public ordering)
and private or customary arrangements. Reduction of law to just one of these
two aspects is mistaken. As well as drawing from custom, law involves an
institutionalized judiciary and a legislative apparatus.
The second ontological claim is that law – understood as an outcome of both
state intervention and private ordering – accounts for many of the rules and
structures of modern capitalist society. Consequently, law is not simply an
expression of power relations, but is also a constitutive part of the
institutionalized power structure, and a major means through which power is
exercised. This claim applies primarily to modern developed capitalist
economies. Underdeveloped societies, where the rule of law is compromised by
a degree of arbitrary power, may depend even more on propaganda and
coercion, and less on the operation of legal rules. But even in these cases, at
least in the modern world, law still plays an important role.
Models of the spontaneous development of law typically rest on relatively small
numbers of agents and underestimate the complexities and uncertainties in
developed capitalism. The law made by organs of the state, including judges and
legislatures, while it may itself reflect customary experiences, is a means of
overcoming this complexity and uncertainty.
Given these claims concerning the nature and central role of law in capitalist
economies, legal institutionalism upholds that an understanding of legal rules is
essential for economists and other social scientists. This is not to say that law is
everything. Not all social rules are laws. As an evolved but also codified system
facing a complex and changing economy, the law is necessarily incomplete and
sometimes self-contradictory. There are important areas of social life that rely
on frequent interpersonal action rather than the anonymous generalities of law.
Nevertheless, the role of law is vital.
The very success of Western capitalism depends on the development of general
national systems of legal enforceability. But these took a long time to establish.
Even today, in much of the world, state systems of law enforcement are weak,
expensive, corrupt or inaccessible. In the absence of adequate systems of law
enforcement, people fall back on other means of establishing obligations and
ensuring compliance. Commerce then works through clan or family ties, shared
1

religion or ethnicity, bureaucratic co-option and corruption, or threats of
violence to person or property. Simply because systems of spontaneous
enforcement existed in history and persist today in certain contexts should not
mislead us into believing that a fully-developed modern capitalist system rests
on purely spontaneous or customary foundations.
Recognizing the centrality of law to the organization of economic and social life
implies that law may vary from place to place with implications for the nature of
contractual, property relations, or the organization of firms. Different legal
systems can set the stage for different modes of social and economic ordering
that seem to be remarkably path dependent (La Porta et al. 2008).
This paper has five further sections. It combines general points concerning the
role of law, with a selective illustrative focus on some key capitalist institutions,
namely property rights, contracts and the firm. Space constraints rule out
discussion of money and financial institutions, for example.2 Section 2 considers
the nature of law and argues that it is irreducible to custom or private ordering
alone. Law involves a combination of customary input and legislative decree.
Section 3 considers whether law is constitutive or epiphenomenal in modern
society. Using Marx’s base-superstructure metaphor, it is shown that law cannot
be consigned to the superstructure. In addition, the state aspects of law should
not be treated as secondary and epiphenomenal, as in some other accounts.
Section 4 considers the nature of property and contract. It shows that property is
often confused with possession, and analyses of contracts and exchange
sometimes downplay the importance of legal rights and obligations. Section 5,
on the firm, shows how the introduction of the important feature of legal
personality clears up some enduring confusions about the nature of the firm.
Section 6 summarizes some key points, compares legal institutionalism with
other institutional approaches in economics, and concludes the essay.
2. The Nature of Law
Some scholars suggest that custom is the key to understanding law. In turn,
custom is seen as evolving without overall guidance and design. Writers in this
tradition include David Hume, Edmund Burke, Friedrich C. von Savigny, Henry
S. Maine, James C. Carter and Friedrich Hayek. Hayek’s writings are among the
most sophisticated. In his classic account of the foundations of law, Hayek
(1973, p. 72) upheld that law ‘is older than legislation’ and that law in some
sense is ‘coeval with society.’ For Hayek, laws are simply the ‘rules which
govern men’s conduct’ (p. 73).
The very concept of ‘customary law’ is sometimes over-extended. Furthermore,
contrary to the impression given by Hayek (1973) and others, common law is
much more than custom, necessarily involving an institutionalized judiciary
2

(Hasnas 2005). Generally, customary mechanisms are insufficient to explain
adherence to nationwide complex systems of law.
Where ‘customary law’ is prevalent, it is often associated with politicoeconomic underdevelopment and failings or remoteness of the state legal
system. When dealing with modern capitalism, law is a matter of state power;
separate customary law dominates only in parts where the state cannot reach,
such as in remote regions. The widening and development of capitalism has
aided this encompassing process. Contracting parties have found it easier to
submit to a single, powerful, legal authority.3
For other theorists, law necessarily involves the state. As the American jurist
Joseph P. Bradley (1902, p. 230) put it:
It matters not how it came to be the law, whether it was prescribed by an
autocrat or a legislative body, or arose from mere custom and usage, or the
decrees of the courts – if the physical power of society, that is the State, is
put forth for its vindication, it is law; if not, it is not law.
Emphasizing the state does not mean that custom is unimportant. The
institutional economist John R. Commons (1924) correctly argued that to be
enforceable (at least in non-totalitarian societies) laws must be widely perceived
as reasonable, appropriate and fair. Consequently, law must largely conform to
established custom, even if it amounts to more than custom alone. Commons
also emphasized that the collective power of the state also lay behind all
property rights and transactions within capitalism. Custom is important to
sustain law, but law is much more than an epiphenomenal expression of custom.
Consider accounts of the spontaneous emergence of law without the state (Greif
1989, 1993, 1994, 2006, Benson, 1990; Ellickson 1991, Greif et al. 1994, Landa
1994, Hadfield and Weingast 2012). In these models, some notion of law
emerges through individual interactions, leading to the formation of
conventional rules. Avner Greif and Janet Landa highlight reputational effects
among ethnic groups. These accounts often refer to the emergence of legal rules
in smaller-scale contexts, or with relatively weak law enforcement by the state.
Itai Sened (1997) addresses standard explanations of the spontaneous evolution
of property and contract that rely on reputation and other effects, involving
smaller numbers of relatively well-informed traders. Sened points out that these
conditions are generally absent in more complex and larger-scale societies, and
rehabilitates a role for the state in the enforcement of property rights and
contracts. He argues that private ordering based on reputational effects is
insufficient to explain the enforcement of property rights.
Amitai Aviram (2004) argued convincingly that private ordering is generally
insufficient to create an enforceable legal authority. A newly formed
3

spontaneous order cannot alone enforce compliance, because mechanisms to
secure this cooperation (such as the threat of exclusion) depend on its ability to
confer benefits to its members, and a newborn order cannot yet confer such
advantages, because it lacks the critical mass to do so. Hence what are described
as ‘private legal systems’ typically do not form spontaneously, but build on preexisting institutions to secure initial compliance. Consequently, private ordering
requires an institutional deus ex machina, such as the state or another strong
prior institution.
Aviram’s argument underlines the distinction between explanations of origin
and explanations of persistence. Crucially, it is difficult for spontaneously
emerging systems of law to gain the critical mass to become pervasive,
notwithstanding the possibility that, once established, they may be sustainable.
Many historical examples of allegedly spontaneous legal systems had nearby
state systems of law, or involved numerous people who had experience of a state
system.
Although privately ordered legal systems are possible in principle, and have
existed historically, there are significant difficulties concerning their
establishment, endurance and perceived moral legitimacy. Nobel Laureate
Ronald Coase (1988, p. 10) wrote:
When the physical facilities are scattered and owned by a vast number of
people with very different interests . . . the establishment and administration
of a private legal system would be very difficult. Those operating in these
markets have to depend, therefore, on the legal system of the State.
Jack Knight (1992) argued that distributional differences and power
asymmetries, rather than spontaneous outcomes of individual interactions,
explain how laws are established. Especially when large numbers of people are
involved, a state machine based on a monopoly of force is typically required to
sustain property and other rights.
While law in complex societies depends on spontaneously-evolved custom, it
also typically requires the powers and institutions of the state. Law in the
modern sense did not exist in simpler and smaller societies. It generally requires
a specialist judiciary within a stratified system of power. Furthermore, in
modern complex societies, there is a legislature that has the capacity to act
proactively and in response to socio-economic changes.
Legal institutionalism upholds that there is a qualitative difference between
custom and law, and a line must be drawn between societies dominated
principally by customary rules and those where a legal system with an
institutionalized judiciary and legislature has also emerged (Hodgson 2009). If
law were no more than custom, then all sorts of relatively minor rules, including
grammatical rules of language and codes of politeness, would be laws. While all
4

legal institutions are systems of rules, not all (customary) systems of rules are
laws. By contrast, work by anthropologists and legal historians has shown that
the evolution of law involves conflict resolution, institutions of law
enforcement, and the transcendence of mere customary arrangements (Diamond
1935, Seagle 1941).
Law is an expression of state power. A statute in an effective legal system exerts
normative force even when it is not immediately applied or followed. Even if a
law is systematically violated or evaded, with the result that the role of the legal
system as an effective mode of social ordering is called into question (see below
our discussion of corruption), the existence of a formal law still has some
institutional and hence economic significance.
Given this view of law as occupying a public space and as an expression of state
capacity, legal institutions must also be regarded as historically specific
phenomena, which, in the Western legal tradition, emerged in Babylonia
roughly four thousand years ago, received their classic development and
codification in Ancient Rome, and developed further in England and elsewhere
in Europe from the twelfth century AD and thereafter (Berman 1983).
In legal institutionalism, then, law is treated as more than custom: it is primarily
constituted by the state. Once we consider the problems of enforcement in a
complex legal system with many agents, and the motivational reasons why
individuals might obey the law, then something like the state is required
ultimately to ensure enforcement. Law emerges in hierarchical and complex
societies with large numbers of individuals. The state must establish a monopoly
of force, restrain vigilantism and minimize extra-legal violence. It uses law to
accomplish these tasks, because the state’s commitment to operate within
predetermined legal constraints enhances its own legitimacy as a power wielder.
Consequently, in practice, and with a few historical exceptions, generally
involving small numbers and relatively low levels of complexity, law requires a
state; conversely, the state is typically a necessary condition of law’s existence.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent us defining law in a very broad sense that
it includes custom. But then we would have to sub-categorize the law and label
the important kind of law that depends upon an institutionalized judiciary or the
state. This subcategory is what many legal scholars and ordinary people mean
by ‘law.’ We adopt a narrower rather than an overly-capacious definition. In this
view, law in the sense we are describing arose when customs were violated and
some permanent and institutionalized higher adjudication was required. This
type of law is indelibly associated with the historical rise of capitalism in recent
centuries.

5

3. Law: Constitutive or Epiphenominal?
Various intellectual traditions have neglected the role of law in their analysis of
modern socio-economic systems. Often law is regarded as a secondary
expression of something else more fundamental. The influential view of Marx is
criticized in this respect. In other prominent and more recent cases, solely the
customary or ‘private ordering’ aspects of law are regarded as fundamental. This
widespread viewpoint shares with Marxism a relegation of the role of legislative
and judicial legal institutions.
First consider the ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ metaphor that is central to
Marxism. In 1859, Marx (1971, p. 20) argued that this base consisted of the
‘totality of … relations of production’ which ‘constitutes the economic structure
of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political
superstructure.’ Similarly, Marx (1971, p. 21) saw ‘property relations’ as
‘merely’ an expression ‘in legal terms’ of these ‘relations of production’ in
society. He argued that ‘it is always necessary to distinguish between the
material transformation of the economic conditions of production’ and ‘the
legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms.’
Hence Marx saw law as relatively superficial and of lower ontological status
than the ‘material’ and ‘economic conditions of production.’ Similarly, in the
first volume of Capital, Marx (1976, p. 178) regarded the ‘juridical relation,
whose form is the contract’ as something that ‘mirrors the economic relation’
where ‘this juridical relation … is itself determined by the economic relation.’
This again suggests that legal forms are surface phenomena.
Whatever the ‘economic structure’ might mean, for Marx its fundamentals do
not include legal relations. The law was seen as an expression or reflection of
‘economic relations’ or ‘relations of production.’ What Marx ruled out is the
possibility that laws may be a necessary and essential part of these ‘economic
relations’ or ‘relations of production.’
For Marxists, class and class struggle are central. In the first sentence of the
opening chapter of the Communist Manifesto of 1848, Marx and Engels (Marx
1973, p. 67) declared: ‘The history of all hitherto existing society is the history
of class struggles.’ But after forty years had elapsed, Engels felt obliged to
define the two main classes of modern capitalism, the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat. To the 1888 English edition he added a note:
By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means
of social production and employers of wage labour. By proletariat, the class
of modern wage labourers who, having no means of production of their own,
are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live. (Marx 1973, p. 67
n.)
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When it came to defining these crucial classes, Engels was obliged to refer to
concepts such as ownership, employment of waged labourers, and the selling of
labour power. None of these terns can be defined adequately without reference
to law and legal ideas. Ownership – in the fullest sense – implies legal rights,
enforced by recognized contract and the legal powers of the state.4 The
employment contract is a specific legal form, differing from a contract for sales
or services. Selling implies the legal transfer of property rights, on a temporary
or permanent basis. The selling of labour power involves the legal transfer of
limited rights of authority over the labourer and the use of his or her capacities
toward contracted purposes. Law appears in the definitions of social classes
which are regarded as fundamental. So law too must be at the foundation.
Marx and Engels were unconvincing in their consignment of law to the more
superficial superstructure. Law is constitutive of social relations, and is
necessary for the definition of modern social classes. Law is not an
epiphenomenon. In modern societies it is a central mechanism of social power.
Modern societies proclaim equality before the law. But differential access to
education, lawmakers and law enforcement creates an uneven playing field.
Powerful actors can influence the making or implementation of law. Marxists
are right to highlight the role of the rich and powerful. But law itself is power
and not merely its instrument. The rule of law puts restraints on power by
circumscribing the actions of the executive and subjecting them to judicial
oversight, as well as providing diverse opportunities for its advancement as
regulators can use their secondary law-making powers to advance their own
agenda. Law can shift the balance of power as different actors discover how best
to use the law to advance their interests.
Apart from Marxism, and throughout the social sciences, law is downgraded in
various ways. For example, as noted above, Hayek saw custom as the essence of
law, thus regulating the legal institutions of the state to a secondary role.
Similarly, new institutional economists such as Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985)
have emphasized ‘private ordering’ over state legal institutions, including courts
and legislatures. Again the law is conceptually downgraded. Institutions of law
that are entwined with the state are regarded as epiphenomenal to customary and
private ordering, rather than regarding the state and customary aspects of law as
mutually constitutive. Consequently, when Hayek, Williamson and others
overemphasize custom and private ordering, to the neglect of the essential role
of the state, they end up treating the state aspects of law as secondary and
epiphenomenal. In this respect their position is similar to that of Marx.
Further similarities between Marxism and other schools of thought that
downgrade law are explored below.5 In particular, there are uncanny similarities
in their mutual treatments of the concept of property.
7

4. Law, Property Rights and Exchange
The aim of this section is to show that the commonplace removal of key legal
considerations, such as institutionally legitimated rights, from key economic
concepts, such as property, contract and exchange, has serious negative
consequences in terms of understanding their nature and function in modern
capitalism.
Legal institutionalism insists that property is more than possession. Yet many
social scientists fail to make this distinction. Possession refers to the control of a
good or resource. It is more about the ability to make effective use than any
established right to do so. Possession is principally a relation of control by a
person over a thing. Possession does not amount to legal ownership. As Richard
Pipes (1999, p. xv) put it: ‘Possession refers to the physical control of assets,
material or incorporeal, without formal title to them: it is ownership de facto not
de jure.’ Although some laws recognize possession as separate right in rem and
property often implies but does not necessitate possession, the two are not the
same:: ‘Property refers to the right of the owner or owners, formally
acknowledged by public authority, both to exploit assets to the exclusion of
everyone else and to dispose of them by sale or otherwise.’ The crucial
difference here involves the granting of formal rights by public authority. Hence
property in the truest sense of the word has another prerequisite – the political
authority of the state. ‘Before the state there is only possession’ (Pipes 1999, p.
117).
Property is a relationship between persons involving rights and duties, with
regard to things (Commons 1924, Hallowell 1943). The essence of the right of
ownership of a resource is its acknowledgement of that right by others who may
have never met the owner and have not entered into any contractual relation
with her, through mechanisms of legal accreditation and legitimation. As James
E. Penner (1997, p. 3) puts it: ‘Viewed in this way, property is a creature of its
environment, the legal system.’
Antony M. Honoré (1961, p. 115) wrote: ‘To have worked out the notion of
‘having a right to’ as distinct from merely ‘having’ … was a major intellectual
achievement. Without it society would have been impossible.’ As Honoré (1961,
p. 134) argued: ‘It is not enough for a legal system to recognize the possibility of
people owning things. There must be rules laying down how ownership is
acquired and lost and how claims to a thing are to rank inter se.’ The legal title
to an object of property refers to the conditions that must be fulfilled in order
that a person may acquire a claim to a thing.
Different types of property right include the right to use a tangible or intangible
asset (usus), the right to appropriate the returns from the asset (usus fructus), the
right to change a good in substance or location (abusus), the right to the capital
8

derived from the use of the good as collateral, the right to sell a good
(alienation), and several other rights or limitations (Hohfeld 1919, Honoré 1961,
p. 113, Pejovich 1990, p. 28). The distinction between different types of
property right is crucial for the workings of any modern economic system. For
example, hiring or leasing something may confer the right of use for a while, but
not necessarily other rights.
Crucially for the functioning of the modern capitalist system, and unlike objects
of mere possession, durable property can be used by its owner as collateral and
can involve legal encumbrances (Arner et al. 2007, Steiger 2008, Heinsohn and
Steiger 2013). The registration of property and its use as collateral for debt is a
crucial institutional mechanism for economic development (De Soto 2000,
Arruñada 2012).
Yet many social scientists treat property principally as a relation between an
individual and a good, thus downplaying the fact that the institution of property
also involves social relations between individuals, and between individuals and
the state. The primary focus is on the individuals, goods, and individual
incentives. The institutions that sustain and legitimate property are given
inadequate attention.
Classic accounts by economists Harold Demsetz (1967) and Richard Posner
(1980) discuss the origin of ‘laws’ of ‘property’ in primitive societies. These are
not so much wrong as mislabeled. Both writers conflated law with custom.
Demsetz’s discussion of the origin of ‘property rights’ is about the origins and
motivations for customary rather than legal rights. Posner addressed primitive
‘laws’ concerning property, contract and marriage. His main claim was that
various forms of these institutions were ‘rational’ in the context of prevailing
information costs and other factors. But his arguments concern custom, rather
than law in the more appropriate sense. And instead of property he describes
possession. Much of Posner’s argument concerning property rests on elabourate
‘insurance’ arrangements between parties that Knight (1992, p. 114)
persuasively argues are unfeasible, principally because problems of uncertainty
and complexity are downplayed.
Armen Alchian (1977, p. 238) defined the ‘property rights’ of a person in the
universal terms of ‘the probability that his decision about demarcated uses of the
resource will determine the use.’ The upshot of this definition is that if a thief
manages to keep stolen goods then he acquires a substantial property right in
them, even if, on the contrary, legal or moral conclusions would suggest that
they remain the rightful property of their original owner. Alchian’s definition of
property neglects the essential concept of rightful ownership. It denotes
possession rather than property. Accordingly, Grossman and Hart (1986, p. 694
n.) claim that ownership is ‘substantially the same’ as possession.
9

Despite its centrality, the concept of property is strangely underdeveloped in
mainstream economics. There is, it is true, a sizeable sub-discipline known as
‘the economics of property rights’ (Furubotn and Pejovich 1972, 1974). But if
we look at this closely then it is clear that the discourse is primarily about
individual incentives rather than about property. To the property rights
economists, the ‘structure of property rights’ refers primarily to a set of
incentives and disincentives for specific individual actions – a Benthamite
calculus of pleasure and pain – but not essentially to the institution of property
itself.
Again there is a remarkable resemblance with Marx’s view. His numerous
discussions of ‘property’ had little to say about legal rights, and he conflated
property with possession. Hence Marx (1975, p. 351) in 1844 addressed ‘private
property’ and argued that ‘an object is only ours when we have it – … when we
directly possess, eat, drink, wear, inhabit it, etc., – in short, when we use it.’
With both Marx and ‘the economics of property rights’, effective power over
something, i.e. might, makes a de facto right. Legal and moral aspects of
property are overshadowed.
The near-universal neglect of legally legitimated rights in the treatment of
‘property’ has major deleterious implications. It weakens our understanding of
the role of the state in sustaining a system of property and it generally relegates
the role of institutions, instead to focus on physical relations between people and
objects. The discourse of rights is vital to understand how these institutions
work and how people are motivated in their dealings with property. As a
particular illustration, addressing environment resource management, Sabine
Hoffman (2013, p. 39) argued ‘that the distinction between possession and
property is of particular importance for comprehending the meaning of
institutional shifts from one resource management regime to another.’
Dean Lueck and Thomas J. Miceli (2007, p. 187) concluded that much of
literature in economics on property rights ‘remains ignorant of property law.’ As
Benito Arruñada (2012, p. 24) pointed out, much economic analysis treats
property as a relatively unproblematic distribution of entitlements and moves
analytical attention toward contracting difficulties and transaction costs.
Property rights are too important to be left to economists. While the distinction
between possession and property is ignored by Marxists and mainstream
economists, it is of supreme analytical and practical significance.
Stating that property rights are critical for modern capitalist systems is not to say
that there is only one way to establish them. Neither does it imply that private
property rights are causally related to growth in any direct fashion. Whether or
not this is the case is ultimately an empirical question and evidence suggests that
it varies over time and depends hugely on sample selection. The point of this
essay is to stress the fact that property is a legal institution and that law therefore
10

must be at the center of a meaningful analysis of property rights as well as the
exchange of assets.
Terms such as exchange or contract suffer a similar evacuation of meaning, not
only in much of economics but also in sociology. As with ‘property’ the
meaning of ‘exchange’ has been stretched to the point that it has become eroded
of meaning and historical specificity.
In sociology the ‘exchange theory’ of George Homans (1961) and Peter Blau
(1964) proposes that a wide range of activities – including gift-giving and
interpersonal communications – are ‘exchanges.’ Similarly the sociologist James
Coleman (1990, p. 37) saw exchange as simply a ‘pairwise exchange of
resources’ without the necessity of a reciprocal exchange of property rights. In
modern social science, concepts such as ‘exchange,’ ‘contract’ and ‘transaction’
are used habitually and without explanatory ado, as if their meaning is always
crystal clear. Yet this is far from the case; the meanings of these concepts cannot
be taken for granted.
This ahistorical concept of exchange in sociology obscures its specific,
contractual form in a market or capitalist society. As Karl H. Rau (1835), Henry
Dunning MacLeod (1878) and John R. Commons (1924) rightly insisted, an
exchange of commodities involves the contractual interchange of property
rights, along with the transferred goods or money. Unless a transfer of property
rights is involved, it is not properly described as an exchange. Property rights, in
turn, are backed up by custom and legal sanctions. Exchange has to be
understood and analyzed in terms of the key social institutions that are required
to sustain it.
More broadly, a legal contract is an agreement entered into voluntarily by two or
more parties with the shared intention of creating legal obligations. It may be
made in writing, verbally, or by other signaled assent. Such a contract could
involve the delivery of services or the exchange of goods. Of course, not all
agreements between adults are legal contracts. Many are acts of reciprocity
between friends and family without any intention of recourse to law if they are
breached. This is recognized by the law of contract itself. But in the wider world
of commerce, potential recourse to law to enforce contracts is vital. An effective
legal system involving contract law is important to extend the sphere of
exchange throughout society and reap its benefits.
In business, as Stewart Macaulay (1963) famously observed, most deals are
enforced without any appeal to the courts, and many even without written
contracts. But this does not mean that legal institutions have no place in
everyday commerce. As Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast
(1994, p. 746) put it, ‘the effectiveness of institutions for punishing contract
violations is sometimes best judged like that of peacetime armies: by how little
11

they must be used.’ Where the rule of law prevails, the mere possibility of
access to the courts is sufficient for the legal system to bear down upon
contractual agreements; hence many apparently self-enforcing agreements are
actually contracts made ‘in the shadow of the law’ (Mnookin and Kornhauser
1979).
The reinstatement of the full legal meanings of property, contract and exchange
are essential not simply to understand the nature of capitalism, but to give sound
and well-grounded policy advice concerning the key institutions of capitalist
development. Accounts that rely simply on the spontaneous development of the
necessary legal infrastructure for a capitalist economy are ill-grounded and
inappropriate for large and complex societies. Relatedly, accounts that omit the
key feature of legally-legitimated rights focus on agent-object relations and
activities, to the neglect of the legal and other social institutions that are
necessary for capitalist prosperity.
5. Law and the Firm
In this section we extend the above argument to firms suggesting that they too
have to be treated as creatures of the law, where law itself is irreducible to
custom or private ordering. Recognition of legal form solves some enduring
problems in the theory of the firm. We use the term firm to apply to individuals
or organizations with the legally recognized capacity to produce goods or
services for sale. A corporation is a kind of firm; it has a structure as designated
under corporate law. All corporations are firms, but not all firms are
corporations.6
Ronald Coase (1937) in his classic article treated the firm and the market as two
alternative ways of organizing productive activity. The firm was defined in
terms of its ‘supersession of the price mechanism’ (p. 389). For Coase (p. 391),
owners of factors of production do ‘not have to make a series of contracts’ with
other factor owners in the production process: ‘For this series of contracts is
substituted one.’ Each factor owner makes a contract with the ‘entrepreneur,’
which was defined as ‘the person or persons who … take the place of the price
mechanism in the direction of resources’ (p. 388 n.).
Note that Coase’s account depends on several legal concepts, including owner,
sale and contract. It was not that he was concentrating purely on ‘economic’
issues, whatever that might mean. It can be objected that Coase’s concept of ‘the
market’ is overly spacious and one must consider relational exchange as well as
markets in the sense of ongoing organized exchange. But the biggest problem in
his classic article is his treatment of the firm itself. Unless this problem is fixed,
his firm-market dichotomy disintegrates.
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Coase (1937) regarded the ‘entrepreneur’ as one or more people. First assume it
is one person. This person then enters into legal contracts with employees and
suppliers of materials, and production takes place. Clearly this firm is a legal
entity in the sense of being structured by relations of property and contract law,
before we even consider whether it has distinct legal capacity as a ‘corporation.’
Coase may have assumed, but did not clearly state in this article, that the
entrepreneur owns the product, and has the right to the revenue from the goods
or services that are produced. Instead of entrepreneurial ownership rights and
potential liabilities, he concentrates on the administrative function of the
entrepreneur, and on details of the employment contract (p. 391). However,
there is nothing natural about the idea that the residual profit from production
vests in the entrepreneur; this results from the legal allocation of property rights
in the surplus from production.
Because Coase concentrated on the input-contracting and administrative
functions of the entrepreneur, he overlooked another important issue. Who is to
be sued if the output of the firm proves defective or dangerous? Is it the
entrepreneur, or the individual worker responsible for the defect? For there to be
a firm, as opposed to a series of bilateral contracts, there must be some entity,
which is the locus of legal liability. But because Coase was insufficiently clear
on the matters of the rights and duties of ownership of the product, he missed
this point entirely.
These problems are compounded if the ‘entrepreneur’ is more than one person.
For instance, what are the ties or incentives that keep the entrepreneurs together
as a team? Coase (1937) was silent on this point too, but there must be some
legally enforceable arrangement that keeps them together, and allows them as a
body to make the contracts with the owners of factors of production. Employees
and suppliers would not make separate contracts with each of the entrepreneurs
as individuals, so with whom are they are contracting? Likewise, if the firm sells
a defective product, then which entrepreneur gets sued? Or are they sued as a
body, in which case how would the liability be shared between them?
If the entrepreneurs were partners then they would often be bound together by a
legal partnership agreement or articles of partnership. This agreement would
specify management responsibilities, shares of profits or losses, and mechanisms
to resolve disputes between partners. Unlike a corporation, partners are jointly
and severally liable for partnership debts. The glue holding the firm together,
and making it a singular unit, is the agreement of joint responsibility between
the partners. Contrary to Coase, the partnership firm is not constituted by
entrepreneurial administration of a production process, but by the legal
presumption that those joining forces to pursue entrepreneurial activities also
share in the responsibilities of these activities.
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If Coase’s entrepreneurs were in a corporation then they would typically be its
shareholders or managers. Legal incorporation means that the state recognizes
the firm as a singular legal person with rights and duties. The corporation does
not simply consist of its entrepreneurs. Neither the entrepreneurs nor the
shareholders own the corporation. The corporation itself is an owning agent; that
is to say, ownership of the assets of the firm are vested in the legal person, the
corporation. Nor is the corporation a res or thing which the shareholders can be
said to own (Deakin, 2012). Shareholders own shares in the corporation, in
principle not the corporation itself (Blair and Stout 1999, Ireland 1999, Robé
2011). Although there are plenty of corporations with only a single shareholder,
including corporations owned by other corporations, we still cannot equate the
corporate form with the single shareholder; both in law and in practice, they are
distinct. The corporation hires the workers, buys machines and raw materials
and sells the output. The corporation is sued if it sells defective products and
sues if it suffered damages from breach of contract and the like. The glue
binding the corporation together is the power of corporate law, the adoption of
its principles by the shareholders, and the agreement between them. Contrary to
Coase, the corporation is not constituted by entrepreneurial administration of a
production process, but by establishment of the singular legal person under
which the entrepreneurs operate.
Eventually this defect caused Coase to abandon a strict firm-market dichotomy.
Coase (1988, p. 27) declared a revised position: ‘I have come across numerous
examples of markets found within firms, but one which amused me was the
discovery of a kind of market operating in the heart of a nationalized industry in
England, the electricity supply industry.’ Coase then quoted from a 1961 lecture
given by an official of the Central Electricity Generating Board: ‘the National
Control Room becomes in effect an auction room, with a National Control
Engineer asking the Regional Centres to quote the price at which they could
supply a certain number of kilowatts at specified periods during the following
day. … Wherever possible he accepts the lowest bid.’ But once we apply clear
legal criteria concerning contracts and ownership, Coase’s argument
disintegrates. The UK Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) was itself a
singular legal person. The regional centers were not legally separate firms but
internal divisions of the CEGB. A complainant would sue the CEGB, not the
regional centers, just as the CEGB would sue any supplier to a regional center
that did not fulfill a contract. The regional centers neither owned nor sold
electricity to the CEGB. Any semblance of contract between the regional centers
and the CEGB would not have been recognized in law as such. It was not an
exchange of property rights because ownership of the electricity remained in the
hands of the CEGB throughout. Instead, the bidding and ‘selling’ of electricity
was an internal management mechanism to reduce costs and encourage increases
in productivity.
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There are often internal negotiations and transfers of resources between
divisions of modern firms. These divisions may have their own accounts and
profit targets. Most firms use price indicators for internal accounting. But are
there ‘internal markets’ within firms? Again a key test is whether or not these
divisions have separate legal status, and are recognized as legal persons. Internal
transfers within the firm do not involve the exchange of legal property rights.
The objects of ‘exchange’ remain the property of the firm. These ‘exchanges’
are not legally enforceable contracts of trade: they are internal transfers. If a
division of the firm is delegated the power to enter into contracts with outside
bodies, then the firm as a whole is legally the party to the contract. The division
acts in the name of the corporation, and the corporation as a whole is legally
responsible for its liabilities under the agreed contract. Because the firm is a
singular legal entity, it cannot make contracts within itself, just as our legs
cannot make a legal contract with our brain to walk or run when instructed.
Like Coase, Oliver Williamson chose to concentrate on the internal organization
of the corporation and to downplay its legal peculiarities and its legal
singularity. Williamson (1985a, p. 318) noted that ‘the centrality of management
… distinguishes it from all other constituencies.’ Williamson (1985b, p. 199)
further explained: ‘whereas each constituent part of the enterprise strikes a
bilateral deal with the firm … management has knowledge of and is implicated
in all of the contracts.’ But this formulation encountered the very same problems
that we have observed with Coase. What legal arrangement binds management,
the officers and directors of a corporation, together? Being ‘implicated in all of
the contracts’ is not the same as making them jointly or in the name of a single
entity.
Due to his preoccupation with private ordering, Williamson downplayed the
firm as a legal entity. Williamson (1985b, p. 184) wrote: ‘Since the efficacy of
court ordering is problematic, contract execution falls heavily on the institutions
of private ordering … This is the world with which transaction cost economics
is concerned.’ But he did not demonstrate that the efficacy of private ordering is
less problematic. For unconvincing reasons, Williamson’s conception of
transaction cost economics excludes the role of publicly articulated legal rules.
This is a serious impairment for the research program, and it is fatal for attempts
to establish a clear identity for corporations and other business organizations.
For Williamson what mattered was the nature of these contracts and the
governance mechanisms involved in their monitoring and enforcement. The firm
was treated as a group of individuals, such as partners or shareholders, who
make contracts with each other and jointly with others. There is nothing here to
make the firm a unitary entity or establish clearly how different stakeholders
relate to one another. Partners may be each other’s agents, but directors and
officers are agents of the corporation, not of the shareholders. The distinction
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between the firm and the market quickly faded. Hence Williamson (1985a, p.
83) was ‘persuaded that transactions in the middle range are much more
common,’ while hierarchies (or firms) become ‘a continuation of market
relations by other means’ (Williamson, 1991, p. 271). He became an advocate of
the firm-market continuum. Williamson (2007, p. 376) wrote:
What defines a firm at the end of the continuum? I take the defining
characteristics of governance structures to be incentive intensity,
administrative control, and the contract law regime. Firms combine
relatively low powered incentives with a lot of control instruments and use
hierarchy rather than courts to settle disputes. Markets are polar opposites,
and hybrids are located in between.
As with Coase (1937), the focus was on the contractual or administrative
organization of production and its internal incentives. Likewise absent here is
any explicit notion of the person or contracting entity that owns the means and
fruits of that production, or can be sued if its outputs are defective. Although the
research program has moved from a dichotomy to a continuum, these sizeable
omissions have been thematic for Coase-Williamson-type transaction cost
economics from the beginning.
It became respectable for other economists and sociologists to argue that the
boundaries of the firm were fuzzy and indistinct. Ideas emerged of ‘internal
markets’ within firms (Doeringer and Piore 1971), of the ‘quasifirm’ (Eccles
1981), of ‘strange forms’ (Ménard 1995, 1996), and the abandonment of any
attempt to define the firm (Cheung 1983). The arguments went like this: the kind
of contracting we observe is typical of neither a market nor a firm, so it must be
some kind of ‘hybrid’ of the two. This ignored the possibility of (non-market)
relational exchange along the lines of George B. Richardson (1972), Victor P.
Goldberg (1980) and Ronald Dore (1983). Most of these relations are, however,
rooted in law. Contracts may be open-ended and may commit the parties to
cooperate rather than to detailed obligations. All of these arrangements have
different ramifications in law. They do not exist outside the law, but are framed
by it.
With Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972) the firm became simply the
individual residual claimant who monitors the team. It is she alone who reaps
the profits, and may sue suppliers, or be sued by customers. The firm can only
be a self-employed contractor, and other forms, such as the partnership or
corporation, are excluded or ignored. If an attempt were made to include
organizations of multiple human individuals as firms, then the alleged
monitoring problem would re-emerge, and one of these individuals – according
to their logic – would have to become the residual claimant. The multiindividual firm would then revert back into a single-individual entity. Despite
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the insights in this important paper, it cannot deal adequately with modern
corporate forms.
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976) identified a key defect in
the approach of Coase and Williamson – its failure to take into account
contractual relations other than with employees and suppliers. Jensen and
Meckling (1976, p. 310) wrote: ‘Contractual relations are the essence of the
firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, and so
on.’ Contracts with customers are also taken into account. Jensen and Meckling
(1976, p. 311 n.) also acknowledged the role of law in a footnote:
Statutory laws sets [sic] bounds on the kind of contracts into which
individuals and organizations may enter without risking criminal
prosecution. The police powers of the state are available and used to enforce
performance of contracts or to enforce the collection of damages for nonperformance.
This is a rare acknowledgement of the significance of the legal aspect of the
firm. But for them the firm is simply a ‘legal fiction which serves as a nexus for
contractual relationships’ (Jensen and Meckling 1976, p. 311). ‘Viewing the
firm as the nexus of a set of contracting relationships among individuals,’ Jensen
and Meckling (1976, p. 311) warned that ‘the personalization of the firm … is
seriously misleading. The firm is not an individual.’
But it needs to be emphasized that legal fictions are not false (Fuller 1967).
They are devices used in legal reasoning to transfer principles that have been
established in one context to another. In the case of the corporation, the legal
fiction involves a transfer of rights and liabilities concerning ownership and
contracting from individuals to registered corporate organizations. This does not
mean that the law grants corporations all the rights that it grants to individuals.
The rights it does grant are subject to change, limitation and dispute. The rights
and liabilities that are important here concern the rights to own assets, enter into
contracts, to sue, and be sued. But in establishing a legal person, the law
imposes conditions on how these powers can be exercised. Modern corporate
law allows corporations to be freely formed, but requires that its governance
structures are transparent and the rights of shareholders and directors or officers
are clearly identified. This would not be the case (or even meaningful) if the law
treated the corporation exactly as an individual.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) failed to acknowledge these nuances. They view
the firm as ‘a set of contracting relationships among individuals’ (p. 311) but do
not show how this ‘nexus’ itself forms a contract with suppliers or customers
when it is no longer deemed to be a singular legal entity. They do not consider
how the problem of how to deal with the death, bankruptcy, or insanity of one of
the individuals that makes up the nexus. In short, they evade the issue of how
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the firm survives the legally-operational lives of the individuals in the nexus.
They also failed to recognize that the corporation faces critical life and death
events that differ from simple contractual relations – including the merger,
acquisition, or liquidation of the entity.
The ‘new property rights theory’ of Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver D. Hart and
John Moore (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart 1989, 1995, Hart and Moore 1990,
Moore 1992) built on several preceding theories but were critical of their
limitations.
Grossman and Hart (1986, pp. 692-3) ‘define the firm as being composed of the
assets (e.g., machines, inventories) that it owns. … We define a firm to consist
of those assets that it owns or over which it has control.’ Or, more crudely, the
firm is viewed ‘as a collection of physical assets’ (Hart and Moore 1990, p.
1121). But a pile of physical assets is insufficient to constitute a firm. Ironically
it misses out the property rights over these assets that are supposedly at the core
of their theory.
Grossman and Hart (1986, p. 693) saw the problem in previous theories as the
lack ‘a sufficiently clear definition of integration.’ In their theory ‘the firm’
owns these assets and holds rights of control over them as well as the rights to
the residual income of the enterprise. Hart (1995, p. 57) argued: ‘A firm’s
nonhuman assets … simply represent the glue that keeps the firm together.’ But
this formulation is inadequate and clumsy. A collection of assets cannot ‘simply
represent the glue that keeps the firm together.’ Even in their own terms it is
ownership or control of these collections of assets that provides the firm with
power over employees and suppliers. These powers are backed by law.
Grossman, Hart and Moore paid even less attention to the legal nature of the
firm than some of the competing theories. Hart (2011, p. 102) asked: ‘is a firm
circumscribed by its legal status or by its economic activities?’ This is a false
and misleading dichotomy. The ‘economic’ activities of the firm become
possible because the firm has a legal status, and has powers enshrined in law. As
Legally recognized capacities define conditions of access to the market; the
capacity to own assets and enter contractual relations (Deakin, 2006, 2012). As
Edward M. Iacobucci and George G. Triantis (2007, p. 518) put it:
Legal persons may vindicate their ownership rights in court, and they may
be defendants against whose property creditors may enforce their claims.
Accordingly, only a legal person has the capacity to contract – that is, to
make a legally enforceable pledge of its assets to the performance of its
promise.
Collections of assets without a legal person as their owner are no more a firm
than a collection of bones, flesh, and blood is a human being. Once the legal and
ownership aspect of the problem is fully acknowledged, then we face the
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question of how the firm establishes itself as a unitary organization, despite the
frequent involvement of multiple directors or shareholders. As Bengt
Holmström (1999, p. 100) put it: ‘property rights theory, as articulated in Hart
and Moore (1990) and other representative pieces, says very little about the firm.
The problem is that there are really no firms in these models, just representative
entrepreneurs.’
These puzzles concerning the nature and identity of the firm are solved once we
recognize it as a legal entity.7 The glue that holds the firm together consists of
the legal provisions that bind the parties into one legal entity, and in turn draw
on appropriate legislation. An entrepreneur or an association of resource owners
become a firm upon the acquisition of a legally-recognized separate legal
personality; its ownership of assets is secondary. In the case of the corporation,
the glue can outlast the lifetimes of the individual members involved. Their
individuals and assets may change many times over. The firm is distinct from its
human constituents. A coalition of owners may create a firm. And firms
typically own non-human assets. But the firm is not the same thing as a coalition
or a collection of assets.
There is no good reason for economists to relinquish a legally-grounded
definition of the firm or corporation. All major theories of the firm depend on
legal concepts – particularly ownership – despite the neglect of the firm itself as
a legal entity. Legal specifications and frameworks are vital for the firm to
operate. Legal relations are an unavoidable part of the definition.
This argument is not undermined, but strengthened, by the real growth of other
economically significant entities such as business units, conglomerates, strategic
alliances, supplier networks, relational contracting and so on. Each of these
entities makes use of legal forms, including contracts, property rights, or
different forms of business organizations and combines them in different ways.
In fact, the growth of a diversity of business and industrial structures makes it
imperative to develop clear, distinct definitions of the different entities involved
and to understand their legal structure. A muddled or mutable reality is no
excuse for muddled definitions. Especially to understand a complex reality we
need clear concepts and careful definitions to guide us.
Legal personality has clear advantages in regard to uncertainties and
complexities surrounding any longstanding contract, and the required
flexibilities that are needed to face an unpredictable future. Rather than
contracting for everything in advance, entrepreneurs rely on evolved commercial
law and the choices of legal template on offer. As Jean-Philippe Robé (2011, p.
17) argued:
One of the key advantages of creating a juridical person owning or
controlling the assets used in the business is precisely that it avoids having
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to agree in advance on detailed contracts among the shareholders to specify
who will do what in what circumstances and get what in return. All the
rights, including the residual control rights in connection with the various
assets contributed to the business, are now owned by the ‘artificial’ juridical
person, not by any of the contracting parties. The so-called ‘legal fiction’ of
the corporation, far from being negligible in economic analysis, is actually
central to it.
Nowhere is this better reflected than in the legal standards that govern the
conduct of directors and officers of the corporation. Their extensive powers to
manage the corporation could easily give rise to abuse were it not for the
broadly defined fiduciary duties the law imposes on them. Hence a major reason
for the adoption of the corporate form is to help cope with future uncertainty.
There are further reasons for the economic effectiveness of the corporate form.
Margaret Blair (1999, 2003) has argued that legal entity status protects corporate
assets by ‘locking-in capital,’ so that it can neither be retrieved by the
shareholders nor taken away by lawsuits from creditors. Similarly, Henry
Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire (2006) wrote of the ‘entity
shielding’ function of the corporation, which protects corporate assets from the
personal creditors of its shareholders, and conversely the shareholders’ creditors
from those of the corporation. These reasons explain why ownership rights to
assets are vested in the corporation itself, and why contracts are made with
corporations rather than with their shareholders.
From the perspective of legal institutionalism, the firm (including the
corporation) has at least two fundamental features: (1) it is set up to produce
goods of services for sale, and (2) in owning assets, contracting inputs and
selling outputs it acts as a legal person. As a legal person, the firm has legal
ownership of the goods as property up to the point that they are exchanged with
the customer, the legal right to obtain contracted remuneration for the produced
services, and the potential liability to be sued for non-fulfillment of contracts
with suppliers or customers, or for tort if defective products cause harm. We
suggest that if a productive entity is not legally structured in this way, it is not,
in economic or other terms, a ‘firm.’
6. Further Applications and Conclusions
The case studies of property, exchange and the firm have shown the limitations
of a purely spontaneous conception of law. Among the reasons why a legal
system has to rest in part on the state – that is, on public ordering – is the high
degree of complexity and uncertainty in large, developed economies. One of the
key features of legal institutionalism is its recognition of this complexity and
uncertainty.
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It has been argued above is that the legal system is part of the state, and the state
is part of its make-up. Consequently, the state is an essential rather than an
accidental property of law. But at the same time, custom is also a vital basis for
law, and is also non-accidental. Law embodies both private (spontaneous) and
state (designed) elements, among its non-accidental properties. These dissimilar
elements are part of the ‘essence’ of law. Accordingly, Katharina Pistor (2013)
uses the term ‘essential hybridity’ to describe this combination.
Legal institutionalism shares with other institutional approaches an emphasis on
the importance of social rules. Indeed, rules are the stuff of social life and
institutions are essentially systems of shared social rules. As Kurt Dopfer, John
Foster and Jason Potts (2004, p. 263) put it: ‘an economic system is a population
of rules, a structure of rules, and a process of rules.’8 Legal institutionalism adds
to this the further claim that many of the more important and powerful rules are
legal in character, and they are backed by the power and authority of the state.
One immediate consequence of this vision is the literal impossibility of
complete de-regulation, or of an unregulated economy or market. Rules are
everywhere, and are essential to social and economic life. All that can be
attained is to change some rules, or to remove some to allow others to do more
work. Rather than universal de-regulation, legal institutionalism addresses the
difficult research question of what kind of rules are appropriate for each
particular circumstance. Given the complexities and uncertainties involved, such
an approach must be cautious and experimental, and cannot proceed on the basis
of complete prior design.
Legal institutionalism also illuminates the phenomenon of corruption.
Corruption has its apologists, such as those who claim that it oils the wheels of
commerce, or that if it is done by mutual consent it must be Pareto efficient
(Huntington 1968). Especially in the context of bureaucracy and
underdevelopment, corruption may seem to be the only way to get things done.
Once again, this view assumes that markets and business naturally operate
outside law and state institutions; law and regulation give rise to corruption
because they increase the costs of commerce. From the perspective of legal
institutionalism, however, corruption appears as the negative image of legal
ordering. It is sometimes defined as the use of the price mechanism where it is
outlawed – as in dealings with the bureaucracy (Rose-Ackerman 1999). What is
outlawed is of course a question of legal design. Corruption can thus serve as a
barometer for the reach of legal ordering in a society or its rejection. The social
costs of corruption may be huge (Hodgson and Jiang 2007). They include the
corrosion of the legal system, in favor of elite interests and nepotism. Evidence
shows that corruption stultifies effective economic competition, undermines
investment, inhibits the rule of law, undermines effective state administration,
and promotes political instability. Several empirical studies indicate that
21

corruption has negative effects on economic performance.9 Given the
importance of effective law and functioning legal systems in economic
development, reduction in the levels of corruption is an important priority. This,
however, cannot be done through law alone, or by removing law where it is
critical for constituting firms, markets, and exchange. Instead, the phenomenon
of corruption evidences that the success of legal solutions depends on their
legitimacy in the eyes of law’s addressees.
What has legal institutionalism in common with the original institutionalism in
economics and the new institutional economics, and how does it differ from
them? Answering this question is tricky because both institutionalisms have
contained a diverse range of thinkers, with some overlap between the two
traditions. In recognizing the historical specificity of property, contract,
exchange and firms, legal institutionalism shares an important insight from the
original institutionalism. Furthermore, the original institutionalist Commons
placed particular emphasis on the role of law, which he regarded as a historically
specific combination of both judicial decree and custom. Other leading original
institutionalists recognized the economic role of law, but gave it less emphasis.
The contribution of Thorstein Veblen, for example, was more to do with the
nature and evolution of institutions (Camic and Hodgson 2011). But both
Veblen and Commons emphasized the importance of intangible as well as
tangible assets, thereby opening the door to a less object-oriented conception of
the economy.
New institutional economists have made major contributions to the development
of the interface between law and economics, but sometimes treat law as a matter
of custom or private ordering alone: this is particularly the case with
Williamson. But on the other hand, Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry
Weingast (2009) have stressed the role of law in general and of legal
incorporation of business firms in particular, in underpinning economic
development and growth.
Legal institutionalism draws from all these traditions, but gives particular
emphasis to the role of the state in the legal system, and to the constitutive role
of law in social and economic life. It further emphasizes the importance of
understanding the institutional processes of legislation and legal evolution.
Accordingly it addresses a series of research questions, including the nature and
effect of variations between different legal systems within capitalism.
Above all, legal institutionalism focuses on the legal and political apparatuses of
power and legitimation that concern abstract rights, as well as the flow of
material goods and services that have preoccupied economists since Adam
Smith. Capitalism is much more than material objects and forces, it is a complex
system for processing information and allocating and protecting rights to
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tangible and intangible assets. Understanding all this is vital for appropriate
policies for capitalist regulation and development.
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Notes
The term ‘legal institutionalism’ has been used by some legal scholars to refer
to institution-orientated theories of law (La Torre 1993, MacCormick 2007). We
use it to denote legally-grounded approaches to the institutional and economic
analysis of capitalism, as in the cases of Commons (1924) and Samuels (1989).
1

2

Money and financial institutions are discussed in Pistor (2013) and Hodgson
(forthcoming).
Private, custom-bound lex mercatoria or ‘law merchants’ blossomed in Europe
from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries. But they declined and were
eventually replaced by state enforcement (Baker 1979; Berman 1983, pp. 33356; Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990). A major reason for their demise seems
to be that they could not cope with the increasing scale and complexity of
contracting.
3

4

Below it is shown that both Marxist and mainstream conceptions of property or
ownership are defective in terms of their understandings of rights.
5

Some libertarian-individualist writers have adopted formulations uncannily
similar to Marxism. For example, a book edited by Pejovich (1997) is titled The
Economic Foundations of Property Rights. But the meaning of these ‘economic
foundations,’ and how they are constituted before property rights are built upon
them, is unexplained. Arguably they are inseparable (Deakin 2006).
Robé (2011, p. 3) argued that firms and corporations are ‘totally different
concepts: a corporation is a legal instrument, with a separate legal personality,
which is used to legally structure the firm; a firm is an organized economic
activity, corporations being used to legally structure most firms of some
significance.’ We would agree to the extent that ‘corporation’ is a legal term of
art whereas ‘firm’ mostly is not. Also, firms as productive entities (a necessarily
broader notion than Robé’s reference to an ‘activity’) may not have legal
personality as such, and embrace many economic relationships in addition to
those described by corporate law. However, qualifying Robé’s point, we suggest
that the term ‘corporation’ can be used to describe productive entities of a
certain kind, above all those which are legally structured in a particular manner
and hence take on distinct economic characteristics (Deakin, 2012).
6

7

The importance of the legal nature of the firm is recognized by Masten (1991),
Phillips (1994), Blair (1999, 2003), Iwai (1999), Hodgson (2002), Hansmann,
Kraakman and Squire (2006), Gindis (2007, 2009), Iacobucci and Triantis
(2007), Spulber (2009), Robé (2011), and Deakin (2012).
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8

See for example North (1990), Crawford and Ostrom (1995), Searle (1995,
2005), Hodgson (1997, 2006), Potts (2000), Vanberg (2002, 2004), Ostrom
(2005), Parra (2005).
9

See Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), Jain (2001), Mo (2001), Aidt
(2003), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004).
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